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Among the myriad of contemporary "pro-life" issues, the issue of
health-care proxy legislation merits discussion because of the increased
attention it is currently receiving in the courts and legislatures.
Health-care proxy legislation seeks to set up a mechanism whereby
an individual (the "declarant") can execute a written declaration appointing another to decide for the declarant, when he or she is unable,
whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment under certain
specified medical conditions. Health-care proxy laws are an outgrowth of
the living will legislation which states began to enact in 1976. Today,
there are over thirty-nine states which have living will laws. Some states
are enacting separate health-care proxy laws, while others are engrafting
health-care proxy amendments on to-already existing living will statutes.
Note here, that with respect to the latter type of laws, it is particularly
important to understand the terminology of the underlying living will
statutes, since it will also usually apply to any new proxy provision.
Very influential upon the shape of the emerging health-care proxy
legislation will be the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws'
health-care proxy amendment to the existing Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (URTIA). In March of this year, the Committee, charged
by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws with drafting this
amendment, met for a two-day conference in Chicago to complete a preliminary draft of the amendment. Evaluated from the perspective of the
United States Catholic Conference's stance on issues concerning termination of treatment, the deliberations and conclusions of the members of
this Committee are disturbing because of their potential for fostering euthanasia and disrespect for human life, especially weakened or disabled
life.
Specific recommendations of the Committee are set forth below.
First, it proposes to expand the coverage of section 2 of the URTIA to
permit not only the execution of a living will, but also the execution of a
declaration appointing another person as "health-care proxy" to make decisions regarding the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment. This is the central operative provision of the proposed amendment.
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Second, the Committee proposed a new section 7 to the URTIA
which addresses health-care "surrogates" as opposed to "proxies." While
a proxy is one designated in writing by a declarant to make health-care
decisions, a surrogate is one designated by operation of law to make the
same kinds of decisions as a proxy makes, in the absence of a proxy declaration. In the absence of a written "surrogate" law, it is common practice
for doctors to consult family members in a certain order of priority to
determine how to handle a patient's life-sustaining medical treatment.
The proposed uniform law merely formalizes and prioritizes this list of
persons. The proposed section applies equally when the patient is a
minor.
One of the persons empowered by section 7 to act as a surrogate is an
individual previously appointed by the patient as an attorney-in-fact.
Presently, neither the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, the
Model Health-Care Consent Act, nor most state durable power-of-attorney acts enable the appointee to decide termination of treatment questions when the executor is unable. The Committee members intend the
language of section 7 to provoke state legislatures to amend their existing
durable power-of-attorney statutes to specifically include the power to
withhold or withdraw the executor's life-sustaining treatment under prescribed circumstances.
Third, the Committee attached a pregnancy protection provision to
section 7, which provides that a doctor must not withhold or withdraw
treatment if the patient is pregnant and there exists the probability that
the fetus could develop to a live birth with continued treatment. Fortunately, this provision controls even in the face of a surrogate's contrary
directions. This protection mirrors existing section 6(c) of URTIA which
applies in a proxy situation, save that section 7 provides even stronger
protection for unborn children since section 6(c) is prefaced with the caveat, "Unless the declaration otherwise provides."
Fourth, with regard to the controversial nutrition and hydration
problem, the Committee was content to draft no new language, but instead to allow URTIA's relevant language to apply also to health-care
proxies and surrogates. Presently the URTIA asserts that it does not
speak to the necessity of nutrition and hydration for either comfort, care
or the alleviation of pain. In practical terms, this means that if a legal
conflict arises over the propriety of withdrawal or withholding of sustenance, a court will most probably be governed by the more than thirty
existing cases which hold that nutrition and hydration are like other
"medical treatment" and may be removed under similar circumstances.
The United States Catholic Conference sees numerous problems both
with the concept of legally enforceable health-care proxies, and with the
finer details of proxy legislation. First, a basic policy problem-healthcare proxy legislation extends into incompetency the already existing po-
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tentialities for euthanasia present in living will laws.
Second, definitions of "terminal condition" which will be incorporated into proxy legislation from existing living will laws are much too
broad and ambiguous. What is important here is whether a statute considers a patient "terminal" if he or she will die soon without the treatment at issue, or with it.
Third, some proposed proxy statutes would permit one minor to appoint another as proxy. Only adults should have the ability to execute a
declaration or be appointed as proxy.
Fourth, some standards of care should govern the proxy's or surrogate's decision making. The proposed uniform health-care proxy amendment has none whatsoever. Proposed section 7 contains only a minimal
safeguard prohibiting a surrogate from contravening the known and expressed wishes of the dying patient.
Fifth, one or two doctors should be involved in evaluating the patient's competency to make decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment. There is too much room for over-reaching if only family or friends
have this responsibility.
Sixth, patients should be able to revoke existing declarations by
merely tearing them up or orally renouncing them. No declarant should
be required to contact his or her doctor to announce a revocation if, for
example, he or she is slipping into incompetency.
Seventh, physicians who disagree with the terms of a declaration or
with a surrogate's instructions must be able to transfer the patient out of
their care. This ability should not hinge upon the physician's previous
disapproval of a patient's declaration since this document may not indicate the specific action (i.e., maintenance or withdrawal of one or more
types of treatment) that will be taken by the proxy; the declaration may
not even contain any operative terms other than the proxy appointment.
Eighth and finally, safeguards concerning pregnancy and sustenance
should be incorporated into every health-care proxy law. The law should
recognize at the very least that provision of nutrition and hydration is
unlike "medical treatment," and thus, cannot be withheld or withdrawn
on the same basis.

